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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
FLORENCE SCHWEITZER,
Plaintiff and Respondent

vs.
HARVEY srrONE, S & I TRUCKING CO.,
A corp., et al,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

I.
THE APPEAL
rl.,his is an appeal from a judgment of the Third
District Court, Su1nn1it County, Judge A. H. Ellett presiding, tried to a jury.
II.
srrATE,~IENT

OF FACTS

On April 20, 1957, Harvey Stone, an employee of
the S & I Trucking Company, was driving a truck and
trailer of that co1npany loaded \vith drilling 1nud. lie
and t\vo other S & I drivers had loaded their trucks
in Salt Lake City earlier that day, and \vere driving
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

eastward on U. S. 30s toward Evanston, Wyoming.
Late that evening, the three S & I Trucks were approaching a hill, or incline, about 16.7 miles east of Echo
Junction. ~L\.t this point the road becon1es three-lane
with two lanes going uphill, or east-vvard, and one lane
downhill or Westward (Ex H-20 and H-13).
Approaching this hill Stone atte1npted to pass the
lead truck, and while passing in the center lane his
engine stalled ( Tr. 75). Stone coasted uphill and as
far as possible to the right until his truck stopped. (Tr.
78).
The last S & I Truck, driven by I van Sh·effy, passed
Stone's truck on the left without crossing the center line
and parked 400 or 500 feet farther up the highway
(Tr. 259, 260). Sheffy parked his truck as far to the
right as he could, set the brakes, left the headlights
on low beam and the clearance lights on, the turn indicator blinking, and proceeded back to Stone's truck
to see if he could be of help. (Tr. 261).
In the 1neantime, Stone turned off his headlights,
leaving his clearance lights, taillights and brake lights
on (Tr. 263, 353). He believed he had run out of gas,
had switched to the auxiliary tank and \vas trying to
start the engine. ( Tr. 76, 265). Innnediately theteafter
a Western Auto Transport Truck loaded with new
pickups and driven by Lloyd V. Higginbotha1n, s1nashed
into the rear of the S & I Truck. Neither Stone nor
Sh·effy savv or heard the approach of the Western Auto
Transport Truck.

11he in1pact of the collision rnoved the Stone truck
2
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ahead 21 feet ( 1_.,r. 142) and thre'v a pickup truck frorn
the Western Auto Transport onto the road in the west
hound lane of traffie. The collision put out all the
light~ on both the Western Auto Transport Truck and
the S & I Truck. (Tr. 77). Stone and Higginbotham had
just succeeded in getting out of their wrecked trucks,
and Sheffy had gotten up frorn where he had been
thrown, \vhen a car driven by John Schweitzer and
oceupied by his wife, Florence Schweitzer, came west\Vard over the crest of the hill.
The scene of the collision is clearly visible for 8/10
of a n1ile to the west, and over 900 feet to the east (Pretrial order, Ex H-13, H-16). Schweitzer testified he
\Vas driving at 45 to 50 1n.p.h.; that when he came over
the crest of the hill a set of bright lights from a stationary vehicle on the road shone in his eyes ; that he let his
foot off the gas, touched the brake and put his own
lights on di1n; that he couldn't see a thing beyond the
lights; that as he passed the stationary vehicle lre put
his O\vn lights on bright and for the first time saw the
\vrecked vehicles ahead; that he then applied his brakes
and turned to the left, 1nissing the pickup and crashed
into the two \vrecked trucks, having left 123 feet of skid
1narks. (Tr. 16-21, 143, Ex. H-13) .
•

He further testified that but for the lights in his
eyes, he could have stopped in ti1ne to avoid the collision. ( Tr. 42)
As a result of injuries received in this collision,
Florence Schweitzer sued Harvey Stone, S & I Trucking Con1pany, Lloyd V. Higginbothan1, Fred Sullivan
and \\:'"estern Auto Transport Co1npany. In the course
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of the trial of the case, at Coalville, Utah, Oct. 26, 27,
28 and 29, 1959, Lloyd V. Higginbotham, Fred Sullivan
and Western Auto Transport Company settled with
her for $10,000.00, the jury returned a verdict upon
special interrogations finding both Lloyd V. Higginbotham and Harvey Stone to be negligent, and a proximate cause of her injuries, and that she suffered dan1ages of $23,000.00. Fro1n this finding, judgn1ent was
entered in favor of Florence Sch,veitzer and against
Harvey Stone and S & I Trucking Co1npany for $13,000,
and it is from this judg1nent the appeal is taken.

III.
STATE~MENT

OF POINTS

I. The lower court erred in refusing to instruct
the jury in accordance with Appellant's requested instruction number two.
II. The lower court erred in refusing to instruct
the jury in accordance with Appellant's requested instruction number four.
III. The lower court erred in the forn1 of the
questions in the special verdict submitted to the jury.
IV. Counsel for Respondent com1nitted prejudicial error in presenting a mathematical per diem formula
to the jury.
IV.
ARGU~IENT

POINT I.

T'I-IIC LOWER COlTRT ERRED IN

R,EFl~SING
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1,0 INSTRUCT THE J1JRY IN ACCORDANCE
\VlrrH 1\ PPELLANT'S RIDQUESTED INSTRUCTION NlT~1BER TWO.

POINT II.
rrHE LOWER t\)T~RT ERRED IN REFUSING
TO INS'rRUCT THE JURY IN ACCORDANCE
WITH APPELLLANT'S REQUE,STED INSTRUCTION NUlVIBER FOUR.
Because the tvvo requested instructions are nearly
identical, we 'vill consider both points together. The
refused instructions are as follows :

No. 2 (R. 65)
"You are instructed that the driver of the
Western Auto Transport Truck vvas negligent a~
a matter of la,v, and if you find that he observed
the stopped S & I Truck upon the highway or
under the circurnstances should have observed
said S & I truck, but because of his neglig'ence
failed to do so in tin1e to avoid the accident, then
you are instructed that the negligence on his part
was the sole proximate cause of the collision between the Western Auto Truck and the S & I
truck, and your verdict n1ust be in favor of defendants Harvey Stone and S & I Trucking Conlpany, and against Florence Schweitzer, Fred Sullivan, Lloyd V. Higginbotham and Western _A_ uto
Transport Company in their clairns against
Harvey Stone and S & I Trucking Co1npany, and
you will further find in favor of HarvP~'" Stone,
Ivan Sheffy and S & I Trucking Co111pany, and
against Lloyd V. Higginbotha1n and \\Tpstcrn
Auto Transport Company, and return verdicts
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therefor in accordance with the instruction on
damages hereinafter given you."
No. 4 (R. 64)
"You are instructed that the driver of the
the ·schweitzer car was negligent as a matter
of law, and if you find that he observed the
hazards, if any, of the stopped vehicles upon the
highway or under the circun1stances should have
observed said vehicles, but because of his negligence failed to do so in time to avoid the collision,
then you are instructed that the negligence on his
part was the sole proximate cause of the collision,
and your verdict must be in favor of the defendants and against plaintiff Florence Schweitzer, no
caus·e of action."
Addressing ourselves first to the situation of Higginbotham, driver of the Western Auto Transport Truck,
it is undisputed there was 8/10 of a 1nile unobstructed
vision to the stalled S & I Truck as Higginbotha1n approached fron1 the west. Higginbotham had his lights
on, and there was no on-con1ing traffic to interfere \vith
his vision. He testified he did not see the S & I truck
until he was 70 feet away (Tr. 93) when it was too late
to avoid the collision.
The conflicts in the evidence here centered around
two items : Whether or not there were lights on the
S & I Truck, and whether th·e S & I Truck \vas partially
into the center lane of traffic or entirely on the outside
lane. These 1natters go to the negligence of Stone, and
not I-Iigginbothan1, for Higginbotha1n is guilty of negligence as a Inatter of la\v \Vhether the S & I Truck was
unlighted (Dalley v. Mid-Western Dairy Products Co.,
80 U 331, 15 P 2nd 309) or lighted (Hirschbach Y.
6
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Dubuque Packing Co., 7U 2nd 7, 316 P 2 319).
This court has recently approved this requested instruction in Mclll1trdie v. Underwood, 9 U2 400, 346 P 2
711, quoting with approval frorn Hillyard v. Utah ByProducts Co., 1 U 2nd 143, 263 P 2nd 287. Thes·e cases
draw the distinction bet\veen two situations:
''The first situation is where one has negligently created a dangerous condition (such as
parking the truck) and a later actor observed,
or circumstances are such that he could not fail
to observe, but negligently failed to avoid it.
The second situation involves conduct of a later
intervening actor who negligently failed to observe the dangerous condition until it was too late
to avoid it. In regard to the first situation it is
held as a rnatter of law that the later intervening
act does interrupt the natural sequence of events
and cut off the legal effect of the negligence of
the initial actor."
Certainly under these circumstances, requested instruction Nurnber Two was proper and its refusal was
prejudicial to appellant. There is a jury question presented, as to whether Higginbotham (with 8/10 of a
1nile unobstructed vision) observed the S & I Truck or
under the circumstances should have seen the truck.
There 'vas no emergency situation here pleaded or
proved and appellant was entitled to argue the lavv of
proximate cause as contained in requested instruction
Number Two.
The circumstances at the time Schweitzer came
over the hill have been previously indicated but will be
amplified here. Looking at Ex H-16, taken 200 feet
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fron1 the starting point of the survey, the scene of the
accident is clearly visible. The pickup, a light colored
one, was sitting broadside in the road at 1100 feet (Ex.
H-13) or 900 feet away. Schweitzer was traveling at
45-50 m.p.h., or 70 feet per second. The lights facing
him were on dim, and \vere on the far side of the road,
not in the next lane. The lights were stationary, and the
turn blinkers were on. Schweitzer did not attempt to
slow down, or bring his car down to a speed he could
control. He continued do\vn the road until past the
lights, at which time he recognized the danger and applied his brakes.
According to Sheffey's testimony, his truck was
400 or 500 feet east of Stone's; if this be accepted then
Schweitzer had available from Sheffey's truck over
double the distance required to stop at 50 m.p.h., the
legal speed llimit and the speed he testified he was driving. (Utah Highway Patrol data, published in Walker
v. Peterson, 278 P 2nd 291).
If Sheffey's testimony in this respect is disregarded,
the fact finder n1ust find that Sheffey's truck was at
least 178 feet in front of the wreck (123 f.eet skid marks
plus 55 feet reaction tin1:e at 70 feet per second.) If
Schweitzer "·as going 50 m.p.h. he could stop in a total
of 183 feet (Walker v. Peterson, Supra) and one look
at Ex H-6 will show that the Schweitzer car was traveling at a considerable rate of speed when it hit the
wrecked trucks.
The only conclusion frorn this is that Schweitzer
was traveling at least 50 rn.p.h. \Vhen he \Vent past the
Sheffy truck, and had not slowed do\vn or taken any
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precaution because of the light~ blinding hin1. In fact,
the physical evidence would seem to show a speed far
in excess of 50 m.p.h. However, if Schweitzer had slowed
appreciably as he passed the Sheffy Truck, he would
have been able to stop prior to the trucks.
A person passing a vehicle and blinded by its lights
is required to use a higher degree of care than normal.
Fretz v. Anderson, 5 U. 2nd 290, 300 P. 2nd 642. If the
Sheffy truck was close to the Stone Truck (i. e., within
200 feet), Schweitzer had over 700 f:eet of highway with
full view of Sheffy's parked truck and blinkers, in
which to decrease speed (as was done in the Fretz case).
rrhe physical facts and Schweitzer's testimony shows
'vithout conflict that Schweitzer did not slow his car,
and blindly 'vent past the Sheffy Truck at at least
50 1n.p.h.
LT nder these circumstances, Schweitzer was clearly
guilty of negligence as a 1natter of law, since teasonable
Inen could not find that he acted with the required
degree of care.
Under this evidence appellant's requested instruction Number Four was proper and the failure to so instruct the jury was error prejudicial to appellant. Appellant was entitled to argue proxin1ate cause to the jury
in light of Sheffy's testimony, which would place
Schweitzer 400 to 500 feet away fron1 the wreck with
unobstruct:ed vision and under circumstances such that
he must have seen it in time to avoid it.
.POINT III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN"

~l"I-IE

FORl\I
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OF THE QUESTIONS IN THE SPECIAL VERDICT
SUBMITTED TO THE JURY.
It was claimed by respondent and by Higgenbotlian1,
Sullivan and Western Auto Traansport Company, that
the S & I vehicle driven by Stone had neither lights nor
flares about it prior to the collision with the. \Vestern
Auto Transport Truck. The evidence was in conflict
as to lights on the truck, and so this was of course a jury
question. It was also clain1ed that Stone was negligent
by allowing the truck to run out of gas, and in failing
to remove it from the traveled portion of the highway.
To resolve these questions, the court submitted a special
verdict. The first question on the special verdict was :
(R-90).
I(A) Was Harvey Stone negligent by allowing the
gasolin:e of one tank to become exhausted before switching to the a uxillary gasoline tank~
I(B) Was Harvey Stone negligent in failing tq
remove the S & I Truck from the travelled portion of
the highway~
I (C) Was Harvey Stone negligent in failing to have
lights on or flares about the S & I Truck imn1:ediately
prior to the collision between the t\vo trucks~
The vice apparent in these questions is that the
matter sub1nitted to the jury is not whether Stone did
or did not do a certain act, but u,hether he was negligent
in so doing. A very similar verdict was considered by
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Johnston 1). Eschrich,
57 N.W. 2nd 396. In that case the clai1n \Vas 1nade that
Eschri eh had driven his truck \vith the tail lights ob-
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scurred. The trial court sub1nitted this interrogatory
to the jury:
''Question One"
"Was the defendant, Wn1. Eschrich, negligent at
the time and place and under the circumstances existing
and just prior to the ti1ne of the accident with respect
to:
(A) Transporting the load on his truck in such a

1nanner so as to obscure the tail

light~

(B) Not having the said truck equuipp:ed with

proper reflectors-"

In passing on this interrogatory the Supren1e Court
said:
"At the very best, the question is confusing,
apparently asking the jury to decide whether it
was negligence for the defendant to transport a
load in such a manner as to obscure a tail light,
a question to which the statute gives an affirnlative answer. The question should be fran1ed so
that the jury may say whether the required light
was present and visibl:e and the question of
negligence would take care of itself. There is
no room in the question submitted for the jury
to answer that the tail light was visible before
the collision, if they believed that to be the fact,
although that is an issue to be determined. We
consider that the question submitted is so subject to misinterpretation by the jur~v that a ne\v
trial must be had in which the respective causal
negligences of the parties may be determined by
answers to questions properly fran1ed."

We sub1nit that despite the cautionary instructions,
11
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the form of the interrogatories is confusing, and in
effect tells the jury that a particular act was or was not
done, leaving only for the jury the question of 'vhether
or not such action was negligence.

POINT IV.
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT COMMITTED
ERROR IN PRESE~NTING A J\IATHEMATICAL
PER DIEM FORJVIULA TO THE JURY.
During his closing argument to the jury respondent's counsel made reference to and argued from a
dollar value mathematical con1putation of damages.
In this connection, he was allowed to use Ex 0-31 in his
argument. Appellant objected to both the exhibit and
the nature of the argument (Tr. 370) but the trial
court perinitted it as proper for the jury's consideration.
Ex 0-31 contains the following:
1335.00
Dee Hospital
835.00
Doctor Bills
164.00
l\Iiscellaneous
Practical Nursing
147
1176.00
100-8
Past Pain and Suffering 10.00
921

Life Expectancy 41 x 365
Pern1anent Disability at 1.00
15%-5%
Future l\1edical
Future Pain

9210.00
14,965.00

1000.00

5000.00
33690.00

12
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14..,ront Ex. 0-31, respondent's counsel argued that
a reasonable surn for the pain and suffering endured by
plaintiff fro1n the date of accident to the date of th·e
trial was $10.00 per day. Since 921 days had elapsed,
this gave the figure of $9210.00 shown on the exhibit.
He also argued that future disability was worth $1.00
per day for her retnaining lif!e expectancy of 14,965
days for a sum of $14,965.00.
Appellant's objection to this line of argu1nent was
based on the holdings of Botta v. Brunner, 138 A 2d
713, 60 ALR 2nd 1331, and the other cases supporting
the position that this constitutes improper argument.
Since these cases and authorities were considered by
this court in Olsen v. Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance
Contpany, No. 9179, in the Supreme Court of Utah, we
\vill not herein cite then1.
Under the holding of the Olsen cas•e, as we read it,
such argurnent rnay be proper in the sound discretion
of the trial court, provided a cautionary instruction is
given to the effect that the cornputation is argument
and nothing els•e. In our case, only two instructions were
given that could in any way be construed as cautionary
on this point.
Instruction Nu1nber Four (R-71) provided in part,
HYou n1ust not consider nor be influenced by any statement of counsel as to 'vha t the evidence is or as to
what the facts are except \vhere such statement \Vas
made as an admission or stipulation on behalf of a party
to the action, unless such state1nent is sho,vn by the
evidence in the case to be correct."
13
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And Instruction Number 19 (R-84) provides in
part "Ther•e is no definite formula known to the law
by which the jury can with exactness ascertain what
would be reasonable compensation for pain and suffering, but it is left to the sound judg1nent and discretion
of the jury trying the case to det:errnine what would
. " ...
b e f a1r
Both of these instructions are general ones, Instruction Number Four as to the jury being sole judges
of fact, and Number Nineteen a tvvo page general instruction on damages. Neither instruction calls attention to the computation used on Ex. 0-31, and at no
time did the court in any way caution the jury to regard
Ex. 0-31 as only "lawyer talk", not evidence.
Ex. 0-31 has three items for future; $1.00 per day
for future disability, $1000.00 for future medicals and
$5000.00 for future pain. There is certainly an overlapping here, that is, some of the disability is due to the
pain and should be considered as one item, not two.
Also, it is interesting to note that plaintiff's Ex. 0-31
showed $33,690.00, and the verdict was for $23,000.00.
We think this shows the jury paid undue attention to
this exhibit in their deliberations.
Under the holding of the Olsen case, we submit,.
that with no cautionary instruction given it was an
abuse of discretion and prejudicial to appellant to permit counsel to argue the per diem co1nputation sho,vn
on Ex. 0-31.
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v.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the
trial court should be reversed and r:emanded to the
trial court for a new trial.
Respectfully suhrnitted,

HOWELL, STINE AND OLJ\1STEAD
RICHAR.D W.

CA~fPBELL

Attorneys for Appellant
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